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Abstract
Diﬀerences across countries or decades in the countercyclical stance of ﬁscal policy can
help identify whether the growth in government spending aﬀects output growth and so
speeds recovery from a recession. We use the heterogeneity in the government-spending
reaction functions across twenty countries in the interwar period to identify this eﬀect.
The main ﬁnding is that the growth of government spending did not have a signiﬁcant
eﬀect on output growth, so that there is little evidence that this central aspect of ﬁscal
policy played a stabilizing role from 1920 to 1939.
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Did the international experience of the interwar period show that expansionary ﬁscal
policy hastened recovery from the Great Depression? Answering this question is an ambi-
tious task, but we try to contribute to the answer by studying a large (for the time) panel
of twenty countries from 1920 to 1939. An advantage of this breadth and of studying this
time period is that there is great heterogeneity both in the business cycles experienced by
these countries and in their ﬁscal policies. For example, France followed a largely passive
ﬁscal policy, while Japan followed a more activist one. This variation across countries in
cycles and policies should help us identify the role of ﬁscal policy. But a disadvantage of
such a panel is that many macroeconomic measures — including consumption and real
wages for example — are not available. So this approach is a complement to studies of
individual countries, like the US and UK, where such series are available.
The limitations of the data, in frequency and coverage, may prevent us from reaching
a precise answer about the eﬃcacy of ﬁscal policy, but it is still of interest to know whether
that is the conclusion. Of course, the answer and its precision depend on an identiﬁcation
scheme. This paper adopts a new one: the main identifying assumption is that counter-
cyclical ﬁscal policy could have worked in any country but was not tried to the same extent
in every country. Identiﬁcation relies on diﬀerences across countries (or over time) in ﬁscal
reaction functions that capture the response of government spending to national income.
We use these diﬀerences to estimate the eﬀect of this government spending on the growth
of income in turn.
For simplicity we use the term ‘Keynesian’ to refer to ﬁscal reaction functions with
a relatively counter-cyclical component. This term is slightly ahistorical for the interwar
period, because The General Theory of course was not published and popularized until
1936. But Keynes advocated public works as an ‘impulse’ to reduce unemployment begin-
ning in 1924 in The Nation. Both Can Lloyd George Do It? (1929) and the The Means to
Prosperity (1933) argued for the ‘cumulative eﬀect’ of public works. Admittedly, this term
also does not do justice to the contributions of Swedish economists. For example, Myrdal
described counter-cyclical government spending in a report for the Unemployment Com-
mission in 1934 entitled The economic eﬀects of ﬁscal policy. Montgomery (1938) instead
referred to counter-cyclical ﬁscal policy as konjunkturpolitik, the adjustment of economic
policy to cyclical change. Jonung (1979) used another contemporary term: krispolitik, the
crisis policy. The roots of this policy lay in arguments by economists such as Wicksell
and Ohlin, though according to Jonung it also was inﬂuenced by Keynes’s writings of the
1920s.
Of course, business cycles in output also were aﬀected by other shocks besides ﬁscal
1policy changes. One example is the decline in US output transmitted to these countries
as a decline in export demand. A second example is the stance of monetary policy, and
speciﬁcally the timing of leaving the gold standard. We control for these shocks in trying to
isolate the eﬀect of changes in government spending. In fact, the identiﬁcation depends on
such observable, exogenous shocks, because output and government spending are treated
as endogenous to each economy.
The paper measures a correlation between the growth of government spending and
the growth of real output, controlling both for other inﬂuences on output and for the
endogeneity of government spending. The idea is that this partial correlation should be
present if ﬁscal policy had a signiﬁcant eﬀect, whatever the mechanism by which this
occurred. There is a signiﬁcant role for US output growth, so it is not the case that no
statistical relationship can be detected because of the limitations of the data. But there is
little evidence that government spending growth aﬀected output growth.
2. Data and Design
The design of the study largely stems from the availability of data. We study twenty
economies for the period from 1920 to 1939: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. The UK and
US are included as inﬂuences on business cycles within this group, though we do not try
to identify ﬁscal policy eﬃcacy using their own policies.
We restrict the investigation to the interwar period for several reasons. First, data for
the period before 1920 are even scarcer and of course would raise the issue of how to model
wartime spending during 1914–1918. Second, data for the period after 1939 would raise
the same issue for 1939–1945. The focus is on whether there is evidence for the eﬃcacy
of ﬁscal policy solely for the interwar period, rather than for long spans or later episodes.
One advantage of this approach is that some research suggests the impact of ﬁscal policy
changes is greater when interest rates are low; in this panel they tend to be low throughout
the interwar period for most countries.
The data are at annual frequency. We selected all countries for which we could ﬁnd
measures of national income (GDP or GNP) and government spending. For most coun-
tries the government spending measure comes from public accounts rather than national
accounts and so includes some transfers. We also use measures of defence spending col-
lected by the League of Nations. The appendix contains details of the sources.
The government spending series we adopt begin in 1924 for Austria, Germany, and
Hungary. Periods of hyperinﬂation thus are omitted from this study. Though it would
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measurement of real government spending during hyperinﬂations, we cannot pursue those
questions given the available data.
Figure 1 shows real national income per capita for each country, scaled so that
1920=100. The great heterogeneity in growth rates is evident, as countries such as Portu-
gal, Japan, and Finland grew, albeit with cycles, while Austria stagnated. Figure 2 shows
that there also was heterogeneity in real government spending per capita, where the role of
the state expanded enormously in Japan while government spending also grew signiﬁcantly
in Germany, Sweden, Finland, and Hungary, for example.
Figure 3 shows government spending as a percentage share of national output for the
20 countries we study during the interwar period. The ﬁgure shows that there is also
much variation across countries in the time path of this ratio. Thus the ordering of paths
for output in ﬁgure 1 is not merely duplicated in the ordering of paths for government
spending in ﬁgure 2, a feature which should aid identiﬁcation. Figure 3 shows that there
were sharp increases in government spending as a share of GDP, for example in Italy in
1936 and in France, Finland, and Hungary in 1939. There also were some sharp decreases,
such as those in Belgium and Czechoslovakia during the 1920s. Notice also that the overall
levels of these shares are in some cases very high; one probably cannot argue that the
government sector was too small to have aﬀected the economy.
It is worth noting some macroeconomic variables that are not available except for
very narrow panels of countries: consumption, hours, markups, average tax rates, real
wages and employment, and country-weights in international trade. We also considered
unemployment rates as an alternate business-cycle indicator, but found that they were
available for many fewer country-year combinations than was true of output. Thus we are
not able to isolate the mechanism by which ﬁscal policy may have aﬀected the path of
national income. For example, we do not know whether ﬁscal policy aﬀected the labour
market via sticky wages, a wealth eﬀect on labour supply, or a signal of future monetary
expansion. Again, we use the word ‘Keynesian’ simply to refer to the relative counter-
cyclicality of government spending and not to the underlying mechanism by which it may
have an eﬀect.
Data are available on tax revenue and hence on budget deﬁcits. They are not included
directly in the statistical model for several reasons. First, a benchmark model of the eﬀects
of tax timing — Ricardian equivalence — holds that the deﬁcit may have any correlation
with output. This absence of a prediction contrasts with the case of government spending,
where a range of macroeconomic models predict a positive impact on output. Second, we
generally do not have data on tax rates and their variation over time and across countries,
3which would be necessary for the careful study of the impact of this aspect of ﬁscal policy.
So we focus in this paper on government spending, like much recent research on post–1945
data. However, we do examine whether the impact of government spending varies with
the level of the government budget deﬁcit.
Overall the design of the study is to include as many countries as possible, partic-
ularly given the low frequency of the available data. We then study the simultaneous
determination of government spending and national income within this panel.
3. Identiﬁcation
The main aim of this paper is to investigate whether the heterogeneity in ﬁscal policy
during the Great Depression can help us identify the impact of ﬁscal policy on output. We
next show how this can potentially provide identiﬁcation.
Let t count years and i count countries. Let yit denote the growth rate of real output
and git denote the growth rate of real government spending. Let xit denote a weakly
exogenous variable, such as output growth in the US or the UK. We study mainly small
and medium-sized economies and so take US and UK output growth as given. We also
discuss alternative exogenous variables below. The i subscript allows for later discussion
of the identity of this exogenous variable to vary across countries.
Then consider a statistical model of domestic output growth as depending on the
growth rate of government spending and on the foreign indicator:
yit = δyi + βigit + ωixit +  yit. (1)
The parameter βi measures the impact of the growth in government spending on the
growth of output while the parameter ωi measures the impact of an exogenous, observed
shock xit. The shock to output growth,  it, captures country-speciﬁc events such as the
Japanese earthquake of 1923, the Credit Anstalt failure in Austria in 1931, or the French
strikes of 1936.
Suppose that the reaction function for ﬁscal policy is:
git = δgi + αiyit +  git. (2)
The parameter αi measures the response of government spending to the domestic business
cycle. A negative value, for example, describes a counter-cyclical policy.
The intercepts δyi and δgi can diﬀer across countries and across variables. The pa-
rameter δyi may reﬂect the productivity or capital accumulation trend in country i. The
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diﬀerence can then capture the secular growth of the state in Japan during the interwar pe-
riod, for example. By allowing for such growth in the output share of government spending
we do not falsely confuse that with cyclical policy.
Estimating the parameters requires statistical assumptions, so we begin with:
Assumption 1 : Ei  yit =E i  git =0 ∀i. (3)
where Ei denotes the expectation over t in country i. The error terms have mean zero in
each country. The sample versions of these moment conditions identify the intercepts.
The second assumption is that the observed, exogenous shock is uncorrelated with the
unobserved shocks to output growth and to government spending growth:
Assumption 2 : Ei  yitxit =E i  gitxit =0 ∀i. (4)
This is an OLS-type assumption that the regressor is uncorrelated with the error terms.
Notice, though, that Assumption 2 does not rule out world shocks during the interwar
period. Output growth yit in country i can still be correlated with output growth in the
US or UK through the term ωixit. And the shocks  yit can be correlated across groups of
the 20 countries, or there can be country-speciﬁc shocks.
In the system (1)-(2) there obviously would be simultaneity bias in OLS estimation of
either equation. Before elaborating on a consistent estimator, we should comment on the
exclusion restrictions in the system. First, xit is excluded from the g-equation (2); foreign
output growth aﬀects domestic output growth but does not directly aﬀect government-
spending growth. The idea is that the former eﬀect stems from trade or ﬁnancial linkages
or from a common component in productivity shocks across countries, whereas it is diﬃcult
to see a reason why domestic ﬁscal policy should respond to the foreign business cycle.
Second, while x shifts the y-equation (1) there is no corresponding shift variable exclusively
in the g-equation (2). It is challenging to measure the exogenous component of elections, for
example, and it seems unlikely that they would not also aﬀect output. For this same reason
any correlation between the two shocks is admissible; we do not assume Ei  yit git =0 .
Assumption 1 identiﬁes the intercepts. Assumption 2 provides two moment condi-
tions, but there are three remaining parameters, βi, ωi, and αi, which thus cannot all be
































5The composite error terms play no role in our identiﬁcation, given Assumption 2, so we









It is easy to see that αi = bgi/byi and thus to see the textbook result that only αi is
identiﬁed. The exclusion of xit from the reaction function allows αi to be identiﬁed, but
one cannot measure βi, the impact of ﬁscal policy on the output growth rate yit.
The reduced-form equations (5) also show that the correlation between y and g does
not tell one about the eﬀectiveness of ﬁscal policy. A positive correlation could reﬂect
either (a) βi = 0 and αi > 0 as growth allowed an expansion of the role of the state, or (b)
βi > 0 and αi < 0, with large enough shocks  git, as in a more Keynesian view. Similarly,
ranking countries by the variance of their output growth rates does not rank them by the
αi, the extent of counter-cyclicality in ﬁscal policy, because the output-growth variance
depends on the shock variance too, which may diﬀer across countries.
The added identiﬁcation relies on the heterogeneity of the reaction function across
countries or over time, combined with a common ﬁscal-policy impact β, as we now show,
with:
Assumption 3 : βi = β; ωi = ω; αi  = αj ∀i. (7)
The impact of changes in government spending or changes in foreign output growth on the
domestic business cycle is the same across countries. But the reaction function parameter,
αi, diﬀers across at least one pair of countries. This is the diﬀerential Keynesianism referred
to in the title of the paper.
To see identiﬁcation it is enough to consider two countries labelled j and k. Assump-
tion 2 now provides 4 moment conditions and, from Assumption 3, there are 4 parameters,
β, ω, αj, and αk so this necessary condition for identiﬁcation is satisﬁed. Again, the
reduced-form equations provide the details. The 2 slopes in the reduced-form system vary


























so that the parameters are just identiﬁed.
To see how to estimate β under Assumptions 1-3, consider basing estimation on the
moment conditions:
Ei(yit − δyi − βgit − ωxit|ι,xit)=0 , (10)
where ι is a vector of ones. Assumption 1 and the instrument ι identiﬁes δyi. Then
suppose there are only two countries, j and k, and so conditions (10) give two further
moment conditions. To show that those conditions identify β and ω, ignore the intercepts
and write the conditions (10) as:
Ejyjtxjt − βEjgjtxjt − ωEjx2
jt =0
Ekyktxkt − βEkgktxkt − ωEkx2
kt =0 .
(11)













which reproduces our ﬁnding (9b). This rewriting thus shows that the moment conditions
(10) use all the information on β from the solved, reduced-form system: having as many
moments (or countries, in this case) as parameters is necessary and suﬃcient for identifying
β.
Figure 4 gives the intuition. The upward-sloping line shows the eﬀect of government
spending growth on output growth, with slope β common to each country. The two
downward-sloping lines show reaction functions, one for country j and one for country k.
A single, observable shock xt shifts the eﬀectiveness curve in the same way for all countries.
That shift traces out the reaction functions and so identiﬁes their slopes αj and αk. But
connecting the dots after such a shock, in other words pooling data from the two countries,
also identiﬁes the slope β, as shown.
Notice that we can think of the system as using a dummy variable which changes α
and so rotates the reaction function. But the implied, additional variable in the reaction
7function is the product of that dummy variable and yit; that product is correlated with
 yt and so is not a valid instrument. That means that country-speciﬁc dummy variables
(or their products with output growth) cannot be used to identify β the way an exogenous
shift in the reaction function would do.
A reduced form with slopes that vary across countries also could result from a structure
in which the stance of ﬁscal policy α was the same across countries but its impact or eﬃcacy,
βi varied across countries. But interpreting the reduced form as we have done is consistent
with the way economists generally have tried to draw lessons from the macroeconomic
experience of the Great Depression. For example, some economists and historians implicitly
argue that counter-cyclical policy (a) was tried in some countries (like Sweden) but not
others and (b) could have worked in the latter countries. We try to study the implications
of this perspective.
It also is important to note that our approach does not require that governments
pursued public works counter-cyclically with stabilization in mind. Any component of
government spending whose cyclicality diﬀered across countries can provide identiﬁcation.
For example, increased defence spending in Japan after 1931, in Germany after 1933, or in
Italy associated with the invasion of Abyssinia in 1936 may provide identifying information.
To take another example, Japan’s ﬁscal expansion in 1931 while Takahashi was ﬁnance
minister contrasts with the ﬁscal retrenchment in Germany under Chancellor Br¨ uning at
the same time, a diﬀerence that again may aid identiﬁcation. However, the key feature
is that these diﬀerences must be in part in the systematic part of government spending
growth, linked to output growth by the parameter αi; they cannot simply be diﬀerences
in shocks  git.
To brieﬂy formalize the identiﬁcation requirements, suppose that there are H elements
in xit and I countries. Denote by n the cardinality (i.e. number of distinct elements) of a
vector of parameters. Identiﬁcation requires:
n(βi)+n(ωi) ≤ I × H. (13)
This is simply the usual method-of-moment requirement that the number of moments
(I ×H) in conditions (10) must be greater than or equal to the number of parameters. For
example, when I = 2 and H = 1 one can identify β and ω. Thus whenever I>2 one can
either relax some restrictions on βi and ωi or gain eﬃciency and test the over-identifying
restrictions. We explore some of these combinations of restrictions below. Not surprisingly,
there is a plausibility vs. eﬃciency tradeoﬀ involved in these restrictions, especially when
there is so little data. But our main goal is not to see how many diﬀerent βi we can identify,
8for no parameter is likely to be precisely estimated with so few time-series observations,
but rather it is to estimate a common β across countries using these restrictions.
The second requirement is:
n(αi) ≥ 2. (14)
At least two distinct values of α are necessary for identiﬁcation. As we add countries
so that I ≥ 2, further, distinct values of α further aid identiﬁcation. (We do not show
that formally because it is a straightforward extension of the earlier algebra.) We provide
evidence below on this condition.
So far we imagine that the diﬀerences in ﬁscal-reaction parameters across countries
apply throughout the interwar period; some countries were more Keynesian than others.
But it also seems plausible that ﬁscal policy became more counter-cyclical over time, as
Keynesian ideas spread. This change is not directly observable, unlike some breaks in
monetary policy such as departure from the gold standard. But one can test for such a
break within this statistical model, and exactly the same algebra just reviewed for two
countries applies in comparing two time periods within a single country. Suppose that s
and t index the 1920s and 1930s respectively and that we replace Assumption 3 with:
Assumption 3 : αis  = αit. (15)
then Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 allow identiﬁcation country-by-country. In this case,
country-speciﬁc values βi and ωi that are constant over time may be more plausible than
ones that also are constant over countries as in Assumption 3. Alternately, we can identify
parameters with a break in αi in each country (or even the same break) combined with a
common β and ω. Again these cross-country restrictions will add to statistical eﬃciency
if they hold.
In sum, if the ﬁscal reaction varied signiﬁcantly across countries or over time —
a subject of independent interest — then there is scope for estimating the impact of
government-spending growth on output growth. Identiﬁcation comes from diﬀerences in
the systematic component of ﬁscal policy, not from trying to isolate properties of exogenous
changes in government spending.
The system (1)–(2) is in growth rates but involves no lags, a speciﬁcation we choose
in order to conserve degrees of freedom ﬁrst because of the short span of annual data. A
second reason for this choice is that a dynamic panel-data model with country-speciﬁc ﬁxed
eﬀects would require further instruments for consistency, which again may be challenging.
A third reason is that there are generally some missing observations in a historical panel
like this one. For example, we do not have government spending data during the Spanish
9civil war or during some of the central European hyperinﬂations of the early 1920s. A
model of growth rates, as opposed to one with higher-order dynamics, gives stationarity
but minimizes the loss of evidence from these missing data. Finally, we also inspect the
residuals for evidence of autocorrelation and ﬁnd no such signiﬁcant pattern. We thus
leave exploring added dynamics for further research with larger data sets. In that case,
one also could apply the identiﬁcation scheme to innovations instead of to growth rates,
based on diﬀerences across countries or over time in how a shock to government spending
is correlated with a shock to output.
The next section compares our method to those in recent research on ﬁscal policy’s
macroeconomic eﬀects. It also gives references to previous research on ﬁscal policy specif-
ically in the interwar period. Then section 5 reports the estimation results.
4. Research Context
This section very brieﬂy outlines research on contemporary ﬁscal policy. One aim is
to explain why we do not use either (a) a DSGE model or (b) a structural VAR model
with unrestricted lags, which are the standard approaches. A second aim is to give the
reader some benchmarks to which to compare our empirical ﬁndings below.
4.1 Fiscal Policy in Recessions
Isolating the eﬀects of changes in ﬁscal policy can be challenging even with contem-
porary, quarterly data. Even for the US, where a long span of data is available, there
is ongoing debate about whether conclusions about the eﬀect of ﬁscal policy depend on
speciﬁc, wartime episodes. Auerbach, Gale, and Harris (2010), Hall (2009), and Ramey
(2011) review methods and ﬁndings from VAR methods and DSGE models as well as from
microeconomic data.
DSGE modelling is challenging for the interwar period because we lack data on mea-
sures such as hours, real wages, markups, tax rates, and consumption reliably for the panel
of countries. Such measures are needed to reliably calibrate the models and to measure
shocks. For example, Cole and Ohanian (2011) ﬁnd one can construct Solow residuals only
for ﬁve countries in our panel (plus the UK and US) because of the lack of employment
data.
In structural VAR models, identiﬁcation of ﬁscal-policy shocks can come from (a)
timing (e.g. the restriction that discretionary ﬁscal policy does not respond to the cycle
within a quarter), (b) sign restrictions, or (c) the narrative approach (including using
military spending). One challenge in applying SVARS to the interwar period is posed by
the shortage of time-series observations because the data are annual. That also may make
10timing restrictions less plausible. As Blanchard and Perotti (2002) note, it seems much
less likely that government spending does not react to output within a year than within
a quarter. That is even more true for a broad deﬁnition of government spending that
includes some transfers.
Hall (2009) reviews multiplier ﬁndings from SVAR studies for the US. He shows that
it is diﬃcult to be precise about the impacts because there was not much variation in
government spending except during World War II and the Korean War. Barro and Redlick
(2009) study a long time series for the US to exploit this sort of variation. In a similar
vein, we exploit the variation across countries during the interwar period. Their equation
for output is similar to ours – output growth explained in part by growth in government
purchases – but they also can include measures of expected growth in government spending
and of tax rate changes; we do not have those series for these 20 countries. Barro and
Redlick also argue that non-defense spending likely responds to the state of the economy;
we use the variation in this response across countries to give identiﬁcation.
A broad theme of much empirical research on the macroeconomic eﬀects of government
spending is that the impact of policy changes may be a variable that depends on such
features as (a) the composition of spending (e.g. on infrastructure or transfers), (b) the
ﬁnancing (e.g. the timing of distorting taxes or the extent to which government spending
signals future monetization), (c) the expected persistence of the policy. Unfortunately,
most of these issues also cannot easily be studied for the interwar period because of data
limitations. But this research also suggests that the impact of policy changes depends on
(d) the state of the business cycle and (e) the presence of a liquidity trap. For example,
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010) ﬁnd for the US that government spending multipliers
are much larger in US recessions than in expansions. Parker (2011) also argues that one
would expect the eﬀect of a shock to government spending to be larger in a recession and
also larger in a liquidity trap. Our study focuses on a period that includes the Great
Depression, when many countries of course experienced both very high unemployment
and very low interest rates. Finally, in the cross-country dimension, Ilzetski, Mendoza,
and V´ egh (2010) argue that the eﬃcacy of ﬁscal policy has recently depended on (f) the
exchange-rate regime. We also control for cross-country diﬀerences in monetary (exchange-
rate) policy.
4.2 Fiscal Policy in the Interwar Period
The eﬀects of ﬁscal policy during the interwar period have been studied most exten-
sively for the US and the UK. Crafts and Fearon (2010) survey research on the 1930s
economy, mainly on those two countries. The upper panel of ﬁgure 5 shows the levels
of real output per capita for the UK (in black) and US (in gray) for the interwar period,
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during the Great Depression are well known, and reﬂected in the ﬁgure. By comparison
with the business cycle in the UK, the depression in the US was (a) much more severe and
(b) with a later trough (in 1933 rather than 1931 for the UK). The vertical scale is the
same as in ﬁgure 1, which thus highlights the even greater heterogeneity of the experiences
of the 20 countries we study.
Fishback (2010) provides a comprehensive review of US monetary and ﬁscal policy in
the 1930s and outlines applications of DSGE models and VAR methods. Among recent
studies, Eggertsson (2008) argues that expected future policy changed in 1933, in the form
of a change in inﬂation expectations. He suggests that one of the triggers for the change
in expectations was the large increase in government spending in 1933. Overall for the
interwar period, though, Fishback reaches the same conclusion as Romer (1992) or Brown
(1956, p 863) that
ﬁscal policy, then, seems to have been an unsuccessful recovery device in the
’thirties not because it did not work, but because it was not tried.
Middleton (2010) describes ﬁscal policy in the UK in the 1930s and reaches a similar
conclusion. However, some recent research for the US argues that increases in government
spending did signiﬁcantly aﬀect the path of output in the very late 1930s and early 1940s.
Gordon and Krenn (2010) conclude from a VAR model that government spending shocks
played a large role in ending the US Great Depression after 1939 but before 1942. For
the 1941–1945 period, McGrattan and Ohanian (2010) use a neoclassical DSGE model to
measure the eﬀects (for example in factor markets) of large ﬁscal shocks and conclude they
had signiﬁcant eﬀects on output.
The lower panel of ﬁgure 5 shows government spending as a share of output in the
UK (in black) and US (in gray). For the UK that share was very stable until 1938. For the
US, the share rose gradually during the early 1930s, then levelled oﬀ, with a well-known
dip in 1937 as some New Deal initiatives were reversed. The ﬁscal expansions in Italy
or Japan were much more dramatic than that in the US. Our approach is based on the
possibility that the extent to which ﬁscal policy was tried diﬀered across countries, as
ﬁgure 3 suggests. Of course, variation across countries in the government spending share
of output does not automatically imply variation in the activist response to output, but
we measure that latter variation explicitly in the next section.
Formal, statistical analysis of the role of ﬁscal policy in individual countries (other
than the US and UK) during the interwar period usually is infeasible because of the absence
of data at greater than annual frequency. But there are some noteworthy exceptions to
this rule. Ritschl (2002) provides a very thorough review of research on ﬁscal policy in
12Germany in the 1930s and an assessment and update of the macroeconomic data, which are
more detailed than for most countries in the panel we study. He estimates a VAR model
and concludes that government budget deﬁcits had no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the path of
German output; rearmament simply crowded out private spending. Cha (2003) estimates
a VAR using a range of monthly data for Japan from 1929 to 1936 and concludes that
ﬁscal shocks did play a large role in its relatively rapid recovery from the Depression.
Histories of the Depression in small, open economies sometimes comment on the stance
and possible impact of ﬁscal policy. Feinstein, Temin, and Toniolo (2008, pp 194-199)
provide a guide to these histories. Examples include the works by Safarian (1970) for
Canada or Montgomery (1938) and Myrdal (1939) for Sweden. Safarian’s (1970) book on
the Great Depression in Canada developed a theme that has been echoed by other research:
he attributed much of the downturn and recovery to events in the US and UK. Jonung
(1979) and Grytten (2006) describe the post-war consensus view that Swedish ﬁscal policy
was eﬀective in reducing the scale of the Depression in Sweden. But they also concur that
economists have been correct to question this consensus since the 1970s. Jonung noted
that formal econometric analysis of the sources of recovery was lacking.
Even some contemporary observers doubted whether the krispolitik had a signiﬁcant
eﬀect on recovery. Myrdal (1939) argued that counter-cyclical policy in Sweden was largely
a failure in part “because this policy was carried out only half-heartedly” (p 183) with pub-
lic works programs “of much smaller scope than would have been desirable” (p 184) and
in part because of the “adverse reaction of business conﬁdence, which has too often re-
stricted or even possibly reversed its stimulating eﬀects” (p 187). The share of government
spending in GDP in Sweden rose from 8.2% in 1930 to 12.4% in 1933, though some other
countries experienced sharper ﬁscal expansions.
Montgomery (1938), in what was surely one of the earliest books on recovery from the
Depression, attributed Sweden’s recovery to ﬂoating the exchange rate (leaving the gold
standard with the UK) and to foreign recovery particularly in the UK. On the eﬀect of
ﬁscal policy changes, however, Montgomery (1938, p 67) also noted:
This question can best be answered by the use of the comparative method. For the
purposes of an enquiry of this kind we ﬁnd the ideal type when those countries
which are to be compared agree in other respects but diﬀer in that particular
point the signiﬁcance of which we intend to investigate. We can hardly expect to
come across such ideal types in the world of reality ...
But we may come across types as close to ideal as possible in this group of countries,
precisely because Sweden, for example, followed a proto-Keynesian policy recommended
by an array of eminent economists while some other countries did not.
13Two recent studies do use international panels to study the interwar period, based
on the idea that the heterogeneity across countries in the scale of the Depression should
be informative. Cole and Ohanian (2011) use a DSGE model with shocks to productivity
and the money supply to study 18 countries for the 1929–1936 period. They ﬁnd a role
for productivity shocks but not for money shocks. In our panel and time period we unfor-
tunately cannot measure productivity shocks for even a majority of countries. However,
we do allow for country-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects in growth rates that may capture some of the
cross-country, real-side diﬀerences detected by Cole and Ohanian.
Almunia, B´ en´ etrix, Eichengreen, O’Rourke, and Rua (2010) study an international
panel of 27 countries from 1925–1939. They estimate an SVAR model with four variables:
defence spending, real GDP, government revenues, and a central bank discount rate. Tests
show that one lag is signiﬁcant in these annual data, and dummy variables by year and
country also are included. Their identiﬁcation then uses a Cholesky decomposition by
ordering the variables, with defence spending not reacting to other shocks within the
year. They ﬁnd large eﬀects of government spending shocks, perhaps due to the low
interest-rate environment, but small monetary-policy eﬀects. They thus conclude that
ﬁscal policy may well have been eﬀective had it been implemented more widely. Almunia
et al also consider other orderings, removing ﬁxed-eﬀects because of possible inconsistency
in a dynamic panel, and estimation with total government spending. With total spending
they also estimate a single-equation model where output growth depends on country and
year eﬀects as well as the growth in government spending and the change in the central
bank’s discount rate, instrumented with defence spending and gold standard participation.
Again they ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects of changes in government spending.
As in their second approach, we study total government spending. We model growth
rates but do not estimate higher-order dynamics given the short span of annual data,
though we do test for residual autocorrelation. Our potential contributions are based on
using the cross-country variation in ﬁscal reaction to assess eﬃcacy (rather than measuring
shocks) and on conditioning on business cycles in the US and UK to provide instruments.
Our ﬁndings from this identiﬁcation end up being diﬀerent from those of Almunia et al:
there is little evidence that government spending growth had a signiﬁcant eﬀect on output
growth overall for the 1920–1939 period.
5. Identiﬁcation from Diﬀerences in Fiscal Reaction across Countries
We ﬁrst present results from the statistical model outlined in section 3. There, we
base identiﬁcation on cross-country diﬀerences in the ﬁscal-reaction parameter, α, and
treat output growth in the US and UK as exogenous. Then we consider controlling for
14exchange-rate changes, allowing β to vary across sub-samples, and estimating the impact
of the growth in defence spending.
5.1 Conditioning on US and UK Growth
Our benchmark, statistical model conditions on output growth in the US, yut, and
output growth in the UK, ykt, which thus compose xit for all countries. Including these as
exogenous variables is designed to capture the eﬀect of the business cycle in the US and
UK on the demand for exports from the countries in the panel. It may also capture an
eﬀect of the US and UK business cycles that operated through ﬁnancial linkages. Initially
we estimate parameters ωu and ωk on US and UK growth that are common across the 20
countries, but we then also allow these to vary over groups of countries and over time. For
example, they may be lower during the relatively autarkic 1930s than during the 1920s.
These foreign variables also can capture the presence of a common, world shock. A
good example is the banking crisis of 1931 that occurred in Austria, Germany, the US,
and other countries. We lack a good ﬁnancial crisis indicator for each country, but these
variables may reﬂect that common shock. This feature of the statistical model also may
capture a common technology shock that we cannot observe directly. For example, Betts,
Bordo, and Redish (1996) ﬁnd evidence of a large, real-side shock, common to both the US
and Canada in the 1930s. They argue that it was a common shock, perhaps rather than
transmission through export demand, a conclusion based in part on study of the terms of
trade.
Deﬁne zit = {ιx it} as the instrument set. Then the estimating equations for GMM
are the sample versions of:
Ei

(yit − δyi − βgit − ωxit) · zit

=0 , (16)
for t = 1921,...,1939 and i =1 ,...,20 countries. Any correlation between  yit and  git is




(git − δgi − αiyit) · zit

= 0 (17)
which thus can be estimated separately with no loss of eﬃciency. Estimation is by
continuously-updated GMM and so standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation.
Table 1 shows results. In the ﬁrst row xit = yut and both β and ω are restricted to
be the same across all 20 countries. The estimated impact of government-spending growth
is positive, but statistically insigniﬁcant at conventional levels of signiﬁcance. But this is
15not because nothing is signiﬁcant; the impact of US output growth on domestic output
growth, measured by ˆ ωu, is positive and signiﬁcant. Naturally, a signiﬁcant x-variable is
necessary for identifying β, and table 1 shows that yut qualiﬁes.
Table 1 also shows the J-test statistic of the over-identifying restrictions, labelled Jy,
along with its p-value. In this case the test readily rejects the hypothesis that β and ω
are the same across all 20 countries. The next two rows therefore relax the restrictions
on the parameters on yut. Weights that diﬀer across countries could reﬂect geography,
comparative advantage, or other causes of diﬀerential trade links to the US. They also can
capture diﬀerences in exposure to the ﬁnancial crisis of the early 1930s.
In the second row the responses to US output growth, labelled ωun, diﬀer across N =4
groups of countries, with the groups sorted by continent: Argentina and Brazil; Australia
and Japan; Canada; and then the 15 European countries. The third row has ﬁner distinc-
tions, with 9 groups of countries: Argentina and Brazil; Australia and Japan; Canada; Fin-
land, Norway, and Sweden; Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands; France and Switzer-
land; Italy; Spain and Portugal; and Austria, Germany, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. In
each of these cases ˆ β remains insigniﬁcant at the 5% level. The p-value associated with the
J-test statistic also rises, and the restrictions now are not rejected at conventional levels
of signiﬁcance, which suggests that this disaggregation is suﬃcient.
The next three rows repeat the analysis but with UK output growth ykt also included
as an exogenous variable. It too at ﬁrst has a common coeﬃcient across countries, to
conserve degrees of freedom. Unlike US output growth yut, this variable is statistically
insigniﬁcant. Again, as we sort the responses to both US and UK output growth, labelled
ωun and ωkn respectively, the coeﬃcient on government spending growth, ˆ β, remains sta-
tistically signiﬁcant, while the p-value for the J-test statistic rises so that the restrictions
are no longer rejected at conventional levels of signiﬁcance. Overall, then, the statistical
model passes this diagnostic test, with a signiﬁcant role for US output growth but not for
domestic government spending growth.
One possible explanation for the lack of precision in estimating β is that, while there
was some variation in the degree of counter-cyclical policy across countries, our instruments
are only weakly correlated with git. In this case, inference about β may be aﬀected by
the syndrome of weak identiﬁcation, which can lead to imprecise estimates and also to
hypothesis tests with incorrect size. Recall from section 3 that identiﬁcation relies at
least one diﬀerence across countries in the ﬁscal-reaction parameters, αi. T oc h e c ko n
the evidence, table 2 presents estimates of the ‘ﬁrst-stage’ moment conditions (17), with
xit = yut. We ﬁrst test whether αi = α for all countries. The ﬁrst row reports the common
estimate ˆ α, the test statistic, and its p-value. The p-value is 0.52, so we cannot reject the
16hypothesis of a common ﬁscal-reaction parameter across the 20 countries. We also found
relatively large p-values for this test statistic within the 9 groups of countries for which
we tried to estimate separate values of β in table 1. Again this raises the possibility that
identiﬁcation is weak.
Imprecision in ˆ αi for individual countries may lead to low power in this test, so we
also allow α to take on a country-speciﬁc value αi while all other countries have a common
value αc
i. We then test whether the two values are equal. Table 2 reports the results for
countries with p-values less than 0.10. In this case, we can reject the null hypothesis of a
common value, at this level of signiﬁcance, for four countries. According to the estimates,
Finland and Portugal had government-spending growth rates which were signiﬁcantly more
pro-cyclical than those of the remaining countries, while the Netherlands and Spain had
more counter-cyclical paths. These diﬀerences suggest that there is enough cross-country
variation in αi to identify β. But further research on tools for inference robust to weak
identiﬁcation (based on cross-equation restrictions) may be appropriate.
We also inspected the 20 residual series visually for evidence of autocorrelation. There
is no such evidence, though perhaps no test will be very informative with this span of annual
data. The ﬁndings so far of course also depend on both the conditioning variables xit and
on the identifying assumptions. We next consider additional x-variables and an alternative
measure of government spending. We then turn to alternative identifying assumptions in
section 6.
5.2 Conditioning on Exchange-Rate Changes
We next control for an indicator of monetary policy. Choudri and Kochin (1980)
reported on the insulating properties of ﬂoating exchange rates for European countries
such as Spain during the Great Depression. Eichengreen and Sachs (1985), Eichengreen
(1992), and Bernanke (1995) have argued persuasively that the event of leaving the gold
standard can be treated as exogenous and that it hastened recovery in a broad cross-section
of countries. Eichengreen (2004) provides a comprehensive review and interpretation of
research on the international Great Depression that also supports this idea. While their
studies focus on the 1930s, there also was great heterogeneity in monetary policy in the
1920s. For example, the depth of the UK depression in the early 1920s often has been
attributed to the Bank of England’s restrictive monetary policy aimed at restoring the
gold standard at pre-war parity. Given this research, we next control for exchange-rate
changes, viewed as an indicator of monetary policy for the interwar period, by including
them as an x-variable when we try to measure the impact of changes in ﬁscal policy.
We ﬁrst include the growth rate of the local-currency price of gold. Thus large val-
ues reﬂect loose monetary policy. This variable may capture the well-known eﬀect that
17reﬂation of the domestic economy was the means by which monetary policy accelerated
recovery. Section 2 noted that government spending series for Austria, Germany, and Hun-
gary begin in 1924, after their hyperinﬂations. We thus omitted these extreme observations
in testing for this eﬀect and used only the depreciations of the new currencies (the shilling,
reichsmark, and peng¨ o respectively) in these countries. Figure 6 shows the time series in
levels, with large, cumulative depreciations in Portugal, Brazil, France, Japan, and Spain.
We studied this rate of depreciation (a) as the sole regressor, with a common coeﬃcient
across countries, (b) alone but allowing for diﬀerent coeﬃcients across groups of countries,
and (c) with US output growth also included. The rate of depreciation was statistically
insigniﬁcant (at conventional levels) in each of these cases, as was the growth rate of
government spending. With disaggregated eﬀects, in case (b), the point estimates of the
impact of depreciations are positive for France and Switzerland and negative for Australia
and Japan, so there is some evidence of heterogeneity across groups of countries in this
eﬀect on output growth. But these responses also are insigniﬁcant, so that one cannot say
that pooling conceals oﬀsetting eﬀects. And when US output growth is included it remains
highly signiﬁcant, essentially reproducing table 1.
How can one reconcile this evidence with the well-known statistical ﬁndings of
Bernanke (1995)? First, we study 1921–1939 whereas he focused on the recovery from the
Great Depression during 1931–1935. Second, he grouped countries according to whether
they were on or oﬀ the gold standard, whereas we measure the rate of depreciation against
gold for each country. He reported a signiﬁcant eﬀect of leaving the gold standard on a
range of economic indicators. We study real GDP growth, whereas his indicators included
manufacturing production and employment, and we also have data on slightly diﬀerent
groups of countries.
To examine the eﬀect of these diﬀerences we also estimated the output equations (a)
with the on/oﬀ gold indicator used by Bernanke (rather than the rate of depreciation), (b)
for 1931–1935, and (c) with dummy variables for each year, as in his study. We found a
positive correlation between being oﬀ gold during the early 1930s and output growth, but
not a statistically signiﬁcant one. The results were similar when we used the on/oﬀ gold
indicator for the entire 1921–1939 time period.
Given Eichengreen’s (1992) conclusions about exogeneity, being on or oﬀ the gold
standard seems a better candidate for an exogenous variable than the scale of depreciation,
which could well respond to business-cycle conditions. But this indicator too is statistically
signiﬁcant for output growth for the entire interwar period. Perhaps that is not surprising,
for the 1920s of course included years in which a number of countries, including Argentina,
Finland, France, Italy, and Sweden, were oﬀ the gold standard yet following monetary
18contractions to try to restore their gold-standard parities. Pooling those episodes with
the subsequent departures from the gold standard in the early 1930s leads to very little
correlation between the exchange-rate regime and output growth.
A second, traditional way to measure exchange rates is relative to other currencies.
This indicator measures relative reﬂation but also may provide information on a mechanism
for recovery: depreciation that promoted net exports. We alternately included the rate
of depreciation of each domestic currency against the US dollar or against sterling. Both
these candidates for inclusion as exogenous variables were statistically insigniﬁcant also.
Finding x-variables to be statistically signiﬁcant is necessary for identiﬁcation here, but
we do not ﬁnd that for exchange-rate depreciations. Omitting them thus does not explain
the insigniﬁcant values of ˆ β found in table 1.
We conclude our discussion of controlling for depreciations with two important quali-
ﬁcations. First, ﬁnding a fool-proof indicator of the exchange-rate regime is not easy even
in postwar data. Rose (2011) notes the lack of consensus on how to classify these regimes
and reviews present-day classiﬁcation methods and their impact. An obvious example of
the pitfalls in such indicators arises for Austria, Czechoslovakia, Germany, and Hungary,
which remained oﬃcially on the gold standard in the 1930s but applied a wide range of
exchange controls. Their nominal exchange rates thus do not provide accurate measures of
domestic reﬂation. Of course, exchange controls also were widespread in the early 1920s.
Second, the statistical insigniﬁcance of the exchange-rate indicators in this panel does
not mean that adhering to, then leaving, the gold standard was not a central cause of
the interwar business cycle. Our statistical model is compatible with the possibility that
monetary policies in the US and the UK were important contributors to the business cycle
in the world economy, as stressed by Feinstein, Temin, and Toniolo (2008). They report
on the simultaneous monetary contractions in the US and Germany in 1931 for example.
But we cannot isolate an additional role for country-speciﬁc exchange rate changes in
these other economies. (In the case of ﬁscal policy, in contrast, few scholars have argued
that government-spending shocks were important in the UK and US business cycles, so our
ﬁnding that we cannot ﬁnd a role for them in these 20 countries reinforces that conclusion.)
5.3 Sorting the Eﬀect of Government Spending Growth
So far we have pooled all observations to allow identiﬁcation and estimate the average
eﬀect of government-spending growth as precisely as possible. But this pooling may obscure
some heterogeneity in β, the parameter that measures the impact of government-spending
growth on output growth. We next explore possible heterogeneity along several dimensions
in which we have reliable data.
19Imagine that β is not a constant but depends on some variable vit. Unfortunately,
we cannot usually add an interaction term vitgit to the y-equation, for vit sometimes will
be endogenous. Thus, we simply sort the observations into groups based on the value of
several criterion variables vit to see if that reveals variation in ˆ β. Of course there is a limit
to this sorting; for example we cannot identify country-speciﬁc values.
The ﬁrst candidate as a sorting criterion is the value of the government budget balance,
as a percentage of national income. The idea of course is that the impact of a change in
government spending might depend on the ﬁnancing method, perhaps with loan-ﬁnanced
changes having a larger eﬀect than tax-ﬁnanced ones. Once again, the interwar period
is an interesting time to study, because there was large variation in budget balances over
time and countries, which should be informative. For example, Belgium, Czechoslovakia,
France, and Italy in the early 1920s all ran budget deﬁcits that often exceeded 10% of
GDP. Other European countries, like Denmark and Switzerland, remained near budget
balance throughout the interwar period. A number of countries, such as Canada, swung
from surplus to deﬁcit during the 1930s. Japan ran surpluses throughout the period.
We sort by observations (not countries) according to the value of the budget surplus
or deﬁcit. Then we re-estimate the y-equation within each group of observations. Table 3
contains the results. The upper two rows divide the observations into two groups, while the
lower three rows divide them into three groups again ranked by budget balances. The x-
variable is US output growth, with a common coeﬃcient within each group of observations.
The point estimate ˆ β is positive in each group of observations, but it remains statisti-
cally insigniﬁcant at conventional levels of signiﬁcance. When we divide the sample in half,
the point estimate is larger for the sample with large budget deﬁcits. But when we divide
the sample in thirds the point estimate is largest for the sample with the largest surpluses.
Meanwhile, US output growth remains statistically signiﬁcant in each sub-sample. The
evidence from the J-test is mixed, with p-values ranging from 0.02 to 0.69, depending on
the sub-sample. Overall then, this ﬁrst sorting does not alter the conclusions.
A second way to sort observations is according to the share of government spending
in GDP. One might expect that the impact of a change in the growth rate of GDP would
be smaller in countries or observations in which government spending is a relatively small
proportion of national income. Again, there is considerable variation in this ratio in these
historical data. Figure 3 shows the government spending share varying widely across
countries and over time. When we sort observations by this ratio and estimate the y-
equation on sub-samples (not shown), we again ﬁnd a highly signiﬁcant role for US output
growth for each sub-sample, but generally no signiﬁcant eﬀect of government-spending
20growth. The only exception occurs for the third of observations with the lowest government
spending shares, where there is a signiﬁcant negative estimate ˆ β.
Our third sorting is by decade. Some modern theoretical research suggests that the
impact of changes in government spending may depend on level of interest rates and
speciﬁcally that β may be larger when the economy is in a liquidity trap. (Ramey (2011),
however, reports that there little evidence of this pattern in US history.) For our historical
panel, ﬁgure 7 shows short-term, market interest rates for a number of countries. Although
there is variation across countries in the overall level of interest rates, there is a trend
down from the 1920s to the 1930s for many countries, including France, Canada, Japan
and Sweden, for example. We do not have complete interest-rate data to incorporate in
the statistical model, but we test whether β took on a diﬀerent value in the 1930s from
that in the 1920s. The results (not shown) show that ˆ β is insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero for both decades. Thus, the ﬁnding of an insigniﬁcant ˆ β for the entire interwar period
is not the result of incorrectly pooling the two decades.
Finally, we also sorted the observations according to the exchange-rate regime and
speciﬁcally by each of (a) whether the gold standard was in place or not, (b) the rate of
depreciation against gold, and (c) the rate of depreciation against the US dollar. This
sorting is designed in part to detect the traditional, Mundell-Fleming view that ﬁscal
policy is more eﬀective under a ﬁxed nominal exchange rate than under a ﬂoating one.
However, once again none of these ways of sorting the observations gives a sub-sample
with a statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient ˆ β on government spending growth. In fact, the
point estimate is negative for low rates of nominal depreciation and positive for high rates
of depreciation.
5.4 Defence Spending
We also can study whether the growth of defence spending inﬂuenced real output
growth during the interwar period. This investigation should be informative, for two
reasons. First, there are sharp spikes up in defence spending in a range of years and
countries, such as Japan during 1932–1934, Italy during 1935–1936 and Australia, Canada,
Portugal, and other countries in 1939, as well as spikes down in Argentina during 1937
and France during 1936. This variation should help identify the impact, if any, on GDP
growth. Second, the impact parameter, β, may be larger for defence spending than for
other categories of spending or transfers, for theory suggests it may be the most stimulative
via its welfare-reducing eﬀect on labour supply. Admittedly, focusing on defence spending
does not answer the question of whether changes in government spending overall aﬀected
the path of output, but it may tell us about a large component of the public-sector budget
and whether it did matter to overall growth or could have done so.
21We draw on data on defence spending from the League of Nations yearbooks, which
yield 313 annual observations. We adopt the same statistical model as for total government
spending and so allow for defence spending to respond to the business cycle. The results are
very similar to those for total spending, shown in table 1, and so are not shown separately.
There is a signiﬁcant role for US output growth, and there is evidence of diﬀerences in
αi, the ﬁscal-reaction parameter for defence spending, across countries and especially over
time. But the impact coeﬃcient ˆ β is statistically insigniﬁcant. Its point estimate sometimes
is negative, depending on the set of cross-country restrictions. In addition, we also ﬁnd no
signiﬁcant role for defence spending when we treat its growth rate as exogenous, and so
estimate by ordinary least squares.
6. Over-Identiﬁcation from Diﬀerences in Fiscal Reaction over Time
So far the ﬁscal-policy reactions we have considered diﬀered across countries but not
over time; we have not allowed for an adoption of Keynesian policies (or any other changes
in their cyclicality) that took place within the interwar period. Recall that it also is
possible to gain identiﬁcation from time-variation in α, as in Assumption 3. To explore
this possibility we required restrictions (16) to hold separately for the 1920s and for the
1930s for each country; for a total of 40 restrictions. If αi varied across decades in several
countries then allowing for this variation should aid identiﬁcation of the ﬁscal-policy impact
parameter β.
Table 4 contains the results. We use the statistic Jy to test the over-identifying
restrictions. The only exogenous regressor is yut, the US output growth rate. The ﬁrst
row applies a common β and ωu to each decade and country, ﬁnding the former to be small
and statistically insigniﬁcant, while the latter is signiﬁcant as in table 1. But the Jy test
rejects the restriction that these parameters are constant over time and countries.
The second row then allows a diﬀerent value of ωu, labelled ωun, for each of N =9
groups of countries: Argentina and Brazil; Australia and Japan; Canada; Finland, Norway,
and Sweden; Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands; France and Switzerland; Italy; Spain
and Portugal; and Austria, Germany, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. Again the idea is that
the impact of US output growth on domestic output growth may well have varied across
regions. Now there are fewer restrictions, but the Jy test statistic still rejects them readily.
The third row allows ωun to vary both across groups of countries and between decades.
This feature allows for the possibility that the impact of the US business cycle fell during
the 1930s due to the worldwide collapse in trade (in turn caused in part by tariﬀ increases
and other autarkic policies), for example. Now the Jy statistic is just at the 5% critical
value. Some research suggests that this test may over-reject, so there is now relatively
22little evidence against the restrictions. Thus we can highlight the ﬁnding on the lack of
impact of government-spending changes: ˆ β is small and insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
We could relax over-identifying restrictions by allowing β to vary across countries too,
but we do not do so for two reasons. First, there are good economic reasons to believe
ωun, the response to US output growth, might be larger for Canada, for example, than for
Sweden or Hungary. We do not have such a reason in the case of β. Second, the aim of the
study is to gain precision in estimating β by pooling information across countries. With
the added restrictions in table 4 we could estimate β and ω separately for each country,
but when we do so they are all statistically insigniﬁcant, an unsurprising result given the
short time span and low frequency of the data. In any case, with 20 countries, one ˆ βi could
be statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level simply due to randomness.
Section 5.1 commented on the potential weak identiﬁcation problem that would arise
with limited variation in αi across countries. Table 2 showed evidence of distinct values for
several countries. The further estimation in table 4 relies on α diﬀering between the 1920s
and 1930s for at least one country. To provide some evidence on this variation, we estimate
a common ﬁscal-reaction for the 1920s that diﬀers from the reaction for the 1930s. We ﬁnd
a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the two coeﬃcients. That diﬀerence is suﬃcient to identify
β, but it also is of independent interest. Notably, when we estimate the reaction function
(17) pooled across countries we ﬁnd a large, signiﬁcant increase in ˆ α from the 1920s to the
1930s, so that on average government spending became less counter-cyclical. The estimate
(with standard error in brackets) rises from -1.33 (0.55) in the 1920s to 0.49 (0.41) in the
1930s. The diﬀerence between these two values of α, is 1.83 (0.62), a shift which provides
identifying information for β. Thus, there is information in the variation across decades in
average ﬁscal reaction, but (a) the change is in the direction of less counter-cyclicality and
(b) exploiting this change to help identify the eﬀectiveness parameter β does not change
the conclusion that it is insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
7. Conclusion
The title of this paper refers to counter-cyclical policy as Keynesian, for simplicity.
But well before the publication of The General Theory, Swedish economists already rec-
ommended konjunkturpolitik, the adjustment of economic policy to cyclical change. This
paper adopts an identiﬁcation scheme that seems to capture the spirit of many informal
assessments of the role of this type of ﬁscal policy in the interwar period. First, it was tried
to a greater extent in some countries than in others (so the reaction-function parameter
αi varied over countries). Second, it could have been used more widely (so the impact
parameter β was the same across countries).
23A study of ﬁscal policy in a panel of many countries in the interwar period cannot rely
on measures of hours or consumption that one would naturally study in assessing more
recent ﬁscal policy. Instead, we look for a correlation between the growth of government
spending and the growth of real output, controlling both for other inﬂuences on output
and for the endogeneity of government spending. The idea is that this partial correlation
should be present if ﬁscal policy had a signiﬁcant eﬀect, whatever the mechanism by which
this occurred.
Identiﬁcation relies on an exogenous variable, and we ﬁnd that US output growth
was statistically signiﬁcant for this panel of economies. Thus, it is not the case that no
relationship can be statistically detected given the data limitations. Next, the last rows of
tables 1 and 4 show that the statistical model passes the J-test so that the over-identifying
restrictions cannot be rejected. In this context, then, could ﬁscal policy have been eﬀective?
When we base identiﬁcation on cross-country diﬀerences in reaction-functions (in the last
row of table 1), the 95% conﬁdence interval for β is (-0.14, 0.18). When we also use
information from changes in ﬁscal reaction functions over time (in the last row of table 4)
the 95% conﬁdence interval for β is (-0.08,0.26). In each case the interval includes zero
and the upper edge is less than the average impact of the US business cycle.
Non-correlation does not necessarily imply non-causation. It is possible that there is
some other variable that aﬀected output and that we have a downward-biased estimate
of the ﬁscal-policy eﬀect because of omitting that. But to account for the non-correlation
here such a variable would need to have been both (a) correlated with output growth over
time and (b) correlated with government-spending growth over time but with the opposite
sign, systematically across countries. It seems more likely that the average impact of
government-spending growth simply was small, so that it could not have had a large eﬀect
on the interwar business cycle.
Assessing the extent to which stabilization with government spending was attempted
is a more challenging question. We generally cannot measure the ﬁscal-reaction coeﬃcient
αi with much precision, precisely because the identiﬁcation relies on allowing it to vary
over countries and decades. But there is signiﬁcant counter-cyclicality in some countries
and pro-cyclicality in others, as well as an overall trend to less counter-cyclicality from the
1920s to the 1930s.
So far, the case that these policies mattered to output growth cannot be proved
using this identiﬁcation and annual macroeconomic data for twenty countries. Finding
an insigniﬁcant eﬀect of government spending growth on output growth for the interwar
period is especially noteworthy because this period included many years with high unem-
ployment, very low interest rates, and large changes in defence spending, a combination
24of circumstances that recent research suggests should be particularly likely to foster a
macroeconomic impact for changes in government spending. But the evidence for these
countries better ﬁts the Treasury view.
258. Appendix: Data Sources
8.1 Countries and Currencies
The twenty countries are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada,
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. The United Kingdom and the United
States are the reference countries.
Five countries changed currencies or had multiple currencies during the period: Ar-
gentina the peso papel and the peso oro; Austria the schilling and the crown; Belgium the
franc and the belga; Germany the reichsmark and papiermark; and Hungary the p¨ engo
and korona. We take these changes into account in constructing exchange rates.
8.2 Nominal Output
Annual, nominal output from 1920 to 1939 come from Michael Bordo’s ﬁnancial crises
dataset http://econweb.rutgers.edu/bordo/Financial Crises Database.zip, which
also gives original sources, except for data for Austria (1924–1937), Czechosolvakia (1920–
1937), and Hungary (1925–1939), which come from Mitchell (1998). Output is measured
as GDP for Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, and Norway and as
GNP for other countries.
8.3 Population
Annual population series are from Bordo (nd) except for data for Czechoslovakia from
Mitchell (2003).
8.4 Government Expenditures
Estimates of current government spending on goods and services on a national ac-
counts basis for the interwar period are scarce. Data are available from Liesner (1989)
only for Australia, Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Sweden, and these series do not
all begin in 1920.
For the full set of countries the measure of government spending is broader and in-
cludes some transfers. Such total government expenditure data are obtained from Mitchell
(1998, 2003). These data are for central governments. The following states were unitary
or highly centralized: Belgium, Brazil (especially after 1930), Czechoslovakia, Denmark,
France, Finland, Germany (especially after 1933), Hungary, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain (until 1932), and Sweden. For more decentralized or federal states
there is the possibility of changes in local government expenditure oﬀsetting those at the
central level. Such states were Argentina, Australia, Austria (though with no state tax
revenue), Brazil (1920–30), Canada, Germany (1920–33), Spain (1932–1939), and Switzer-
land.
Due to the data not being expressed in calendar years for all countries, and due to
diﬀerences in the reporting of data for ﬁscal years, two types of moving averages were com-
puted to approximate calendar-year expenditures from ﬁscal-year expenditures, wherever
applicable. For Australia, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Norway, and Sweden the data was
26reported for the ﬁscal year ending in the given calendar year (e.g. 1920 data actually cor-
responding to 1919–20 ﬁscal-year data), so the moving average for that year was calculated
using the ﬁscal year that followed (e.g. the average of 1919–20 and 1920–21). In contrast,
for Canada, Germany, and Japan the data was reported for the ﬁscal year ending in the
next calendar year (e.g. 1920 data actually corresponding to 1920–21 ﬁscal-year data), so
the moving average for that year was calculated using the ﬁscal year that preceded it. Fi-
nally, some countries (France, Portugal, and Sweden) changed ﬁscal years and so required
weights that varied over time in order to approximate calendar-year data from ﬁscal-year
data. The details are available from the authors.
8.5 Deﬂators
Real output and government expenditures are estimated by dividing the nominal
series by cost-of-living indexes from Bordo except for data for Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
and Spain which are from Mitchell (1998). For Austria and Germany, prices are in terms of
gold after currency stabilizations in 1922 and 1923 respectively. To avoid hyperinﬂationary
periods we include Austria from 1923 and Germany and Hungary from 1924.
8.6 Government Revenue
Government revenues are from Mitchell (1998, 2003). Exact deﬁnitions of revenues
diﬀer from country to country, with some total revenue ﬁgures being only for taxation. Af-
ter being adjusted from a ﬁscal-year to a calendar-year basis (as described for expenditures
above), they are used with total government spending to calculate nominal government
budgetary balance in each year. The ratio to nominal GDP is then used as the budget
balance share.
8.7 Exchange Rates
Exchange rates are measured ﬁrst in national currency per USD, from the League of
Nations (1926–1940). They are converted to gold values by multiplication by the USD
value in terms of gold from Oﬃcer and Williamson (2010).
8.8 Unemployment Rates
Unemployment rates are from Mitchell (1998) or Maddison (2003), which present
diﬀerent measures. But there are no data for Argentina, Brazil, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Portugal, or Spain, and those for France, Italy, and Japan are for limited years. The total
number of country-year observations was 199, compared to the 369 observations on real
output.
8.9 Defence Spending
Annual defence spending is from the League of Nations (1924–1940) yearbooks, then
deﬂated by the national cost-of-living index.
8.10 Interest Rates
Interest rates are short-term commercial paper or Treasury bill rates, where available,
for 13 countries, from Bordo or the League of Nations.
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land and Stewart.Table 1: Fiscal-Policy Impact 1921–1939
E(yit − δyi − βgit − ωxit|ι,xit)=0
t = 1921, ... , 1939
ωxit ˆ β ˆ ωu ˆ ωk Jy(df )
(se) (se) (se) (p)
ωuyut 0.05 0.29 — 40.8(18)
(0.09) (0.04) (0.00)
ωunyut 0.12 -0.28/0.46 – 22.7(15)
N = 4 (0.09) ((0.10/0.15) (0.09)
ωunyut 0.02 -0.26/0.47 – 12.2(10)
N = 9 (0.10) ((0.13/0.17) (0.27)
ωuyut + ωkykt 0.03 0.27 0.06 59.5(37)
(0.07) (0.04) (0.10) (0.01)
ωunyut + ωknykt 0.07 -0.18/0.40 -0.63/0.36 39.1(31)
N = 4 (0.07) (0.11/0.16) (0.29/0.41) (0.15)
ωunyut + ωknykt 0.02 -0.23/0.38 -0.59/0.46 22.8(21)
N = 9 (0.08) (0.16/0.18) (0.38/0.48) (0.35)
Notes: There are I × T = 350 observations; y is real output growth; g is
real government spending growth; yu and yk are growth in the US and UK.
Estimation is by continuously updated GMM. The Jy-statistic tests the
overidentifyingrestrictions. For parameters that vary across N groups of
countries, entries are the minium and maximum estimates, with their
standard errors.Table 2: Cross-Country Diﬀerences in Fiscal Reactions
E(git − δgi − αiyit|ι,yut)=0
t = 1921, ... , 1939
Countries ˆ αc
i ˆ αi Jg(df )
(se)( se)( p)
All -0.07 – 17.9(19)
(0.25) (0.52)
Finland -0.26 2.82 9.1(1)
(0.27) (1.08) (0.00)
Netherlands -0.04 -3.90 3.2(1)
(0.26) (2.54) (0.07)
Portugal -0.08 6.11 3.4(1)
(0.28) (2.73) (0.07)
Spain -0.07 -2.57 14.7(1)
(0.56) (3.09) (0.00)
Notes: yu is US output growth. Jg(19) tests αi = α ∀i
while Jg(1) tests αi = αc
i, the common value for all
countries except i.Table 3: Sorting the Fiscal-Policy Impact by Budget Balance
E(yit − δyi − βgit − ωuyut|ι,xit)=0
t = 1921, ... , 1939
Surplus Range ˆ β ˆ ωu Jy(df )
(se) (se) (p)
-29% to -1.6% 0.12 0.36 28.2(15)
(0.07) (0.05) (0.02)
-1.6% to 12.6% 0.04 0.16 14.2(15)
(0.09) (0.06) (0.51)
-29% to -2.8% 0.08 0.32 19.2(14)
(0.06) (0.06) (0.16)
-2.8% to -0.6% 0.05 0.35 28.4(15)
(0.09) (0.07) (0.02)
-0.6% to 12.6% 0.10 0.16 9.12(12)
(0.12) (0.07) (0.69)
Notes: There are I × T = 350 observations; y is real output
growth; g is real government growth; yu is growth in the US.
The budget balance is a share of GDP. Estimation is by
continuously updated GMM. The Jy- statistic tests the
overidentifying restrictions.Table 4: Fiscal-Policy Impact 1921–1939
E(yit − δyi − βgit − ωuyut|ι,yut)=0
t = 1921, ... , 1929 and t = 1930, ... , 1939
ωu ˆ β ˆ ωu Jy(df )
(se) (se) (p)
ωu 0.04 0.28 78.2(38)
(0.06) (0.04) (0.00)
ωun 0.03 – 55.4(30)
N = 9 (0.06) (0.00)
ωun: 1921–1929 0.09 – 32.9(21)
ω
un: 1930–1939 (0.09) (0.05)
N =9
Notes: There are I × T = 350 observations; y is real output
growth, g is real government spending growth; yu is growth
in the US. The moment conditions apply for each decade
and each country separately. N is the number of groups
of countries. Estimation is by continuously updated GMM.
The Jy-statistic tests the over-identifying restrictions.Figure 1: Real Output per capita 1920-1939
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HungaryFigure 2: Real government spending per capita 1920-1939
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GermanyFigure 3: Government Spending Shares of Output
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gjt = δgj + αjyjt +  gjt
Figure 4: Fiscal policy responses and eﬀectiveness
Countries i =j, k: identifying αj and αk,a n dβ
gkt = δgk + αkykt +  gkt
Slope: β
yit = δy + βgit + ωxt +  ytFigure 5: US and UK Data 1920-1939
                   Real Output per capita
Year











































Government Spending Share of Output
Year




















































UKFigure 6: Gold Prices/Exchange Rates
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JapanFigure 7: Short-Term Interest Rates
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